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Abstract. In the early twentieth century, Indian Bureau officials noted an in-
creasing incidence of tribal factionalism parallel to changes in Indian reservation 
leadership. They described this factionalism in terms of a progressive-traditional 
dichotomy. Modern scholars have unintentionally fallen into this semantic trap. 
This article explores the complexity of individual motivations and factional poli-
tics among the Northern Utes through the life of William Wash and suggests that 
such cultural middlemen offer a more complete picture of reservation politics. 
In June 1865 leaders from the Tumpanuwac, San Pitch, and Pahvant bands 
of Ute (Nuiiu) Indians gathered at Spanish Fork to relinquish their lands. 
In return, O. H. Irish, superintendent of Indian affairs for Utah Territory, 
promised them a permanent reservation in the isolated Uintah Basin of 
eastern Utah, where they could hunt and gather until such time as the 
government saw fit to transform them into settled and self-sufficient agri-
culturalists. These Ute leaders realized they had few options. They them-
selves were leaders of recent status-men like Tabby who rallied group 
consensus away from the Ute war leaders Wakara and Black Hawk. Since 
the Mormon invasion in 1847, they had watched their people succumb to 
epidemic disease, starvation, and warfare. In 1865 Ute leaders accepted 
the Spanish Fork Treaty as a tactical retreat and began moving toward 
their new homeland. 
In that year of change-change in leadership, location, and future-
a Uintah Ute child was born. Named Na-am-quitch, he was the eldest 
son of Zowoff and Nunanumquitch. In later years he became known as 
Wash's Son and finally as William Wash.! Wash was both ordinary and 
extraordinary. He never became a formal political leader of his people, 
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yet his success as a rancher gained him the recognition and respect of 
both Utes and whites at the Uintah-Ouray Reservation. Agency officials 
called him one of the more "progressive" full-blood individuals of the 
Uintah band, one of three Northern Ute bands to share the four-million-
acre reservation. Yet Wash frequently frustrated these same agents by 
rejecting the progressive and acting in what they considered to be very 
"traditional" ways. Until his death in April 1928, he moved between two 
cultural worlds on the reservation. He was what Loretta Fowler calls an 
"intermediary" or a "middleman," one of the new or transitional types of 
leader to arise during the early reservation years.1 
The importance of people like William Wash lies not only in their 
own unique experiences but in their shared experiences and the larger 
themes which emerge from study of their lives. Nearly two decades ago 
Robert Berkhofer, Jr., told ethnohistorians that they must emphasize Indi-
ans in their histories, particularly "the uniqueness of the stories of specific 
individuals."] From works on more famous or infamous individuals,4 the 
study of Indian biography has begun to focus on "culturally marginal per-
sonages," those less-known "bicultural" individuals who spent their lives 
on the borders between ethnic groups, mastering the knowledge of two 
cultures without being immobilized by the process.5 
Berkhofer also suggests that this individualized focus will aid schol-
ars in untangling the web of inter- and intragroup factionalism.6 Existing 
models of tribal factionalism generalize "group" traits without getting 
"bogged down" in individual motivation and variation? Without pay-
ing close attention over time to individual actors (who are difficult to 
find and trace in most records), scholars tend to perpetuate the static 
emic categories of "traditional" and "progressive," an unrealistically neat 
dichotomy or unilinear continuum created by nineteenth- and twentieth-
century observers and frequently used to generalize about the social, 
economic, and political nature of reservation factionalism. Reliance on 
these sources, particularly by historians who perhaps have been more sus-
ceptible to the generalization, produces a two-dimensional, dichotomous 
picture of native people, issues, and factionalism. 
While anthropologists and ethnohistorians eschew the progressive-
traditional dichotomy as ethnocentric and value-Iaden,8 the terms and 
their variants still appear all too frequently.9 Often qualified with quo-
tation marks, they have become a kind of professional shorthand for 
describing individuals, factionalism, and the process of acculturation. lO 
The unspoken understanding is that we are simplifying a complex, dy-
namic situation out of necessity, trusting that colleagues will recognize our 
dilemma and hoping that others will not read overly static meanings into 
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these useful, if somewhat misleading, terms. We deny the dichotomy but 
we fall back on it, perhaps because in our histories we do not understand 
or cannot fully untangle the temporal threads of personal motive and 
behavior which guide individuals and draw them into factions or groups. 
The weakness of this progressive-traditional dichotomy becomes 
most apparent in attempts to categorize complex individuals, particu-
larly the intermediaries, the middlemen, the cultural brokers, the "150% 
men" who operate on the cultural margins. William Wash became such a 
figure among the Northern Utes. Not a recognized "headman" yet vocal 
in councils, Wash represents the substratum of reservation politics, the 
influential individuals who worked the margins of tribal leadership and 
white acceptance. His experience mirrors that of perhaps a majority of 
early twentieth-century Native Americans struggling to come to terms 
with their own culture and with American society. 
William Wash was born into a world of both change and persistence as 
his people moved toward the Uintah Basin. We know little about his early 
life other than what we can assume given the history of the Uintah Reser-
vation. 1I There the different Utah Ute bands coalesced into a single band 
called the Uintah. The federal government encouraged Utes to settle near 
the agency and begin farming. Most, however, continued their seasonal 
subsistence pursuits and drew rations in order to avoid starvation on the 
agency farms. Some, like Zowoff and Wash, tried their hand at farming, 
braving the ridicule of other Ute males for gathering vegetal material and 
digging in the earth, the subsistence province of women. Raising cattle 
or hauling freight for the agency came much more easily for Ute men 
seeking to reproduce male work and subsistence spheres. Wash and his 
father received special gratuity payments from the Indian Bureau for their 
farming efforts. By 1891, Wash owned a number of cattle and worked 
part-time for the agency as a herder.12 Agents viewed him as a progressive 
Indian. 
According to Ute agents, the definition of "progressive" revolved 
around two elements, economic and historical. First, agents identified 
progressive Utes by their subsistence activities, particularly by their com-
mitment to a settled and self-sufficient agrarian lifestyle. This lifestyle was 
defined in part by their willingness to dress, act, and speak like whites, 
live in houses, and send their children to school. Second, this designation 
devolved to a comparison of Ute bands and their reservation histories, 
particularly after the 1881 forced removal of White River and Uncom-
pahgre Utes from their Colorado homelands to the Uintah and Ouray 
reservations. The consolidation of the Uintah, White River, and Uncom-
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pahgre bands created a number of problems, including a series of inter-
and intra band factional disputes over leadership, past treaty negotiations, 
and the distribution of natural resources and annuity payments. 
Out of these disputes Ute agents identified "progressive" and "tra-
ditional" factions. The Uintah Utes, because of their long contact history 
and exposure to reservation agriculture, were the most progressive of the 
Northern Ute bands. The Uncompahgre band suffered the most internal 
divisions between the progressive Indians (led by Shavanaux and Alhan-
dra) who settled on river-bottom farms and those (led by Sowawick) who 
preferred to maintain a more nomadic, up-country, herding and hunt-
ing lifestyle. Finally, there were the White Rivers, whom agents classed 
as wild and rebellious traditionalists, adamantly opposed to any effort 
to change their way of life. This growing factionalism, based on what 
agents perceived as a progressive-traditional dichotomy running along 
band lines, was in fact individualistic, fluid, and issue- and economics-
oriented. Ll 
William Wash played some role in these factional divisions by virtue 
of his Uintah band affiliation and his three marriages, particularly the 
last, to Lucy Alhandra, daughter of the progressive Uncompahgre leader 
"Charley" Alhandra. 14 More important factors, however, were his eco-
nomic activities as a farmer, rancher, and agency herder, as well as his 
familiar relations with the white agents. As agency herder, Wash came 
under fire from Tim Johnson, spokesman for the White River tradition-
alists. Johnson claimed that Wash was in league with agency attempts 
to lease Ute grazing lands in the Strawberry Valley to white Mormon 
ranchers. Johnson criticized Wash because "he does all kind of work" and 
asked that Wash and the agency farmer, men who symbolized progressive 
agriculture, both be "sent away." 15 
In 1903, the White River and Uintah bands faced a common threat, 
the prospect of allotment. Despite widespread Ute opposition, 75 Uintah 
and 7 White River Utes out of 280 eligible males signed the allotment 
article. These, Special Agent James McLaughlin acknowledged, signed 
mainly to show their goodwill in the face of what they understood to be 
an inevitable process. Yet by signing the allotment agreement, these indi-
viduals reaffirmed a perceived division between "progressive" Uintah and 
"conservative" White River Utes and created a further division within 
the Uintah band. William Wash, aged thirty-eight, was one of these pro-
gressive Uintah signatories. Dissenting White River leaders threatened to 
leave the reservation if allotment proceeded; indeed, they carried out that 
threat in 1906-8, leading nearly four hundred Utes to South Dakota.16 
With this "tribal" division into two apparently distinct factions, 
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Wash began to consolidate his social and economic position as a progres-
sive spokesman. 'In 1903, he sold 25,530 pounds of loose hay to the troops 
at Fort Duchesne, and in 1905 he received his eighty-acre allotment on 
the southeastern end of Indian Bench above Fort Duchesne. That year he 
raised ten bushels of potatoes, fourteen hundred bushels of oats, and one 
hundred bushels of wheat and harvested three hundred tons of alfalfa. 
His 640 rods of fencing and his log cabin attest to his industry but prob-
ably more so to substantial assistance from agency personnel. At the same 
time, Wash ran a sizable cattle herd in the Dry Gulch region southwest of 
.Fort Duchesne. l ? 
In a 1907 council with Uintah Utes, Agent C. G. Hall tried to quiet 
rumors that "Mormons" were going to take over both the opened reserva-
tion and allotted lands. In this council, with the absence of so many Utes 
in South Dakota, William Wash emerged as a Uintah spokesman. He told 
the assembly: 
I hear about the way Secretary of the Interior talk to us. I always take 
Washington's advice. About farming, about everything. I never say 
no any time. This land that is allotted to me is mine. That make my 
heart [feel good]. I can't wait to go work my land. I have been work-
ing the way Washington want me to. I have a fence around eighty 
acres. I am putting in some crops. I got hands to work with like 
everybody. I lost a good deal of money in some way by white men 
renting my farm. This leasing of land to the whites is a swindle. If 
I work it myself I get the money that comes from the farming. The 
Indians do not know how to make money off their land. They don't 
know whether the white man is handling it right or not. 
Beneath his own espousal of white economic values, Wash was apparently 
concerned about the vacant allotments of those White River Utes in South 
Dakota, fearing the land would be leased or sold-lost in either case from 
Ute control. He continued: "About the White Rivers. Washington never 
told them to go to another country. They are getting themselves poor. 
Losing everything. This is their home .... I want everything to be right. 
Don't want little children starving. It makes me feel sorry when people 
move around and let little children get hurt. They are pretty hard up I 
think. Maybe they come back now to raise something." 18 
The White River Utes did return to the allotted reservation in 1908, 
under military guard, physically defeated, and with little means of sup-
port. Many had no idea where their allotments were, had nothing to work 
their land with if they wanted to, and were reluctant to work for wages 
on the ongoing Uintah Irrigation Project. Many ultimately leased their 
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lands to white settlers, hoping to earn some money and protect their water 
rights against usufruct Utah water laws. Wash's hopes seemed dim. 
At this juncture we get a glimpse of another side of William Wash, 
one that casts a different light on his economic activities and social aspi-
rations. Inspector Harwood Hall visited the reservation shortly after the 
White Rivers returned and reported that all the Northern Utes "are quite 
poor, and were it not for rations issued by the government and assistance 
given many of them by an Indian by name of Wash, who is fairly well off, 
it is difficult to see how they would secure sufficient food to subsist." 19 
From this and other evidence, it appears not only that Wash was accu-
mulating wealth in a white-approved manner (ranching and farming) but 
that he was using the proceeds (particularly his cattle) to help feed needy 
members of all three Ute bands. Instead of observing market economy 
values, he reproduced in part the individualistic role of local Ute leaders 
by distributing goods in return for sociopolitical recognition. Wash used 
his position as a cultural intermediary in order to help his people, to gain 
traditional respect, and to attempt to fill a growing vacuum in Northern 
Ute leadership.20 
Between 1912 and 1914, Wash's visibility in tribal affairs increased. 
He was not considered a "chief" in general Ute councils with the fed-
eral government, but he was actively involved in reservation politics, par-
ticularly over issues of ranching and land use. Once we discern some 
of the cultural values and motives behind his actions, it becomes clear 
that Wash's activities are more complex than~an be explained with a 
static model of factionalism based on a simple progressive-traditional di-
chotomy. 
In 1912, Uintah-Ouray agency stockmen expressed concern with the 
number of "wild ponies" roaming the 250,ooo-acre Ute Grazing Reserve. 
The issue of Ute horses had been a constant source of conflict between 
Utes and agency personnel. Agents argued that horses gave the Utes too 
much mobility, perpetuated racing and gambling customs, and grazed 
ranges more profitably reserved for cattle and sheep. Utes, on the other 
hand, valued horses as prestige items, traditional forms of wealth, status, 
and security. They felt (and still feel) an attachment to the horse out of 
proportion to its market value. The destruction of horses in 1879 precipi-
tated the White River attack on the Utes' Colorado agency. Agents in Utah 
came to realize that horses, not cattle, defined the social and economic 
status of Ute men.21 
In 1912, Wash was one of these men, wealthy both by Ute stan-
dards (he owned about fifty horses) and by white (two hundred cattle and 
forty sheep). He headed an affinal and kin-based cattle association which 
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controlled 395 cattle, IIS sheep, and one of the four bands of "wild" 
horses roaming the grazing reserve. His position gave him a great say in 
Indian Bureau plans to clear the range. At a gathering of seventeen leading 
Ute stockmen, Wash initiated a plan to periodically round up unbranded 
horses and divide them among members of the roundup crew. He offered 
to supply both mounted men and extra saddle horses for the roundup 
and agreed to the construction of corrals on his land. Wash may have 
been interested in rounding up wild horses, but it seems likely that he 
was interested in doing so not to preserve the range for additional cattle 
and sheep, as desired by the white officials, but to obtain or retain more 
horses, thereby adding to his source of traditional wealth and statusP 
In 1913, Ute livestock owners met in council to oppose leasing the 
Ute Grazing Reserve to James S. Murdock, a white sheepman. Once 
again Wash spoke for his people, summarizing Ute opposition to the pro-
posed lease: 
When we used to talk about this reservation a long time ago, way 
back in Washington, we leased some land. That is past now .... 
Now the way it is about this land, it is different than before we were 
allotted. All these Indians understand what you told them to do and 
now we have talked about it. Now we have some horses, and we 
know about how to take care of them now and make use of them on 
this land. The Indian has always held it, they do not want to lease 
it at all. As we have horses, cattle, and stock there is no place for 
Murdock to lease, as all the Indians on the grazing land clear up to 
Lake Fork have stock and we do not want it leased at all. I have the 
right to depend on that country, I have some cattle of my own. 
Superintendent Jewell D. Martin thanked him: "I am glad to hear what 
Wash has said because he has more stock than any other Indian on the 
reservation and knows more about the live stock industry here and I am 
glad he has expressed his judgment." lJ 
Two points of interest emerge from this exchange. First, by his words 
before his assembled peers, Wash indicated his continuing commitment 
to horses, even his commitment to horses over cattle and sheep. He came 
to this point of view as Ute agents attempted to reduce the number of Ute 
horses by emphasizing improved livestock and range management. Even 
progressive Ute stockmen like Wash resisted agency efforts to castrate 
their "ponie stallions," preferring a culturally derived balance between 
quantity and quality. Wash emphasized the continuity of the horse, as 
both symbol and reality, in Northern Ute culture.14 
Second, Wash opposed leasing the tribally controlled grazing reserve. 
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In council meetings later that year Wash and other progressive ranchers 
clashed with a group of White River traditionalists over the creation of 
a tribal herd. The cattlemen argued that a herd would benefit the tribe 
economically, provide a market for surplus hay, and keep land-grabbing 
whites from getting a foothold on the reserve through leasing. The White 
Rivers also feared the threat of white homesteaders, but they desired cash, 
not cattle-an equitable distribution of benefits from the grazing reserve 
in the form of lease monies rather than its use by a select few Ute cattle-
men. 
Although the council approved the proposed tribal herd when the 
White Rivers walked out, Superintendent Martin killed the plan, which 
smacked of "tribal interest rather than individual interest." In his haste 
to stamp out collectivism, Martin missed the point. These progressive 
cattlemen intended to partition the herd, "allowing each family to take 
its share of the cattle and take care of them." In effect, these Utes under-
stood better than Martin that the government would spend tribal funds 
only for tribal (as opposed to individual) economic development plans, 
that such communalism clashed with their individualistic subsistence tra-
ditions, and that in the past, communalistic policies and agency herds had 
failed. This proposal by Wash and the progressive cattlemen was both a 
way to get tribal funds over to individuals and a conservative plan to pro-
tect the integrity of the Ute Grazing Reserve. Ultimately, it promised to 
benefit each Ute household in more ways than the simple lease fees desired 
by the White Rivers-progressive-sounding means securing an essentially 
conservative outcome.25 
In 1914, Wash appeared in the middle of another reservation power 
struggle, between an overly enthusiastic superintendent and commissioner 
and the Ute followers of the Sun Dance religion. As early as 1905, Ute 
agents had complained that the annual Ute Bear Dance and Sun Dance 
were morally and economically counterproductive, that they destroyed 
health and morals and took people away from their farms at critical times 
in the growing season. In 1913, Martin failed to convince Ute leaders to 
hold the Bear and Sun dances together at midsummer agricultural fairs as 
a sort of commercial sideshow. Unable to co-opt or halt them, Commis-
sioner Cato Sells officially prohibited both dances, which were "incom-
patible with industrial development and altogether out of harmony with 
a higher civilization." 26 
While the Bear Dance was one of the oldest of Ute rituals, the 
Sun Dance religion was a recent innovationP Introduced in the 1890S 
by Grant Bullethead, a Uintah Ute who learned the ceremony at the 
Wind River Shoshone Reservation, the Sun Dance filled a void for people 
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struggling with the unrest and dislocation associated with allotment. 
The dance echoed the individualistic tenor of Ute beliefs while offering 
group strength through communal participation. The Ute people seized 
the model, reinterpreted it in terms of their own cultural categories, 
and reproduced their own religious system, with its emphasis on curing, 
within the framework of that single dance. The Sun Dance religion offered 
the Northern Utes an active option for binding themselves together and 
dealing with the directed changes of an allotted agrarian lifestyle.28 
Despite the Indian Bureau ban, a number of White River and Uintah 
Utes proceeded with the 1914 Sun Dance. Upset and uncertain what to do, 
William Wash telegraphed Interior Secretary Franklin K. Lane: "Indians 
will hold annual harvest dance about June twenty fifth to thirtieth / an-
cient custom / supervisor objects / wire reply." Cloaking the Sun Dance in 
harvest imagery to make it more palatable to white officials was an old Ute 
tactic, but the reply shot back that the Sun Dance, "or dance of a similar 
nature, such as usually held at this season of year," was prohibited. Super-
intendent Martin assured the commissioner that after informing a "bunch 
of the influential ones" who had sent the telegram, the "better class" of 
Indians agreed not to dance. Still, two Sun Dances went on as sched-
uled that summer. Martin reported that about 150 "retrogressive White 
River Indians" insisted on the dance, which was attended by over three 
hundred Utes-what he dismissed as a "minor fraction." Martin asked 
for additional assistance to suppress the dance, for, as they often did, 
his Indian policemen protected their own people by selectively enforcing 
Indian Bureau orders.29 
Was William Wash, the leader of the "bunch of the influential ones" 
who sent the telegram, also one of the "better class" who agreed not to 
hold the dance? Or did this group concede defeat to Martin and then par-
ticipate in the dance anyway? After investigating the dance, U.S. Marshall 
Aquilla Nebeker reported that Martin "believes that the best Indians, and 
a majority over all, are supporters of his and are in harmony with his 
ideas; but I am forced to the opinion that in this he is mistaken; and 
I could recite many circumstances and conversations which I think are 
withheld from the Agent, but such recitals would burden this communi-
cation and probably would not be considered competent." Nebeker heard 
and saw what Martin and the Indian Bureau ignored, and he probably 
heard some of it from Martin's own progressive Utes.30 
Nebeker reported that the dance took place on the grazing reserve 
around Lake Fork, thirty-five miles northwest of Myton, Utah. Other 
records indicate that William Wash "controlled" that particular area of 
the grazing reserve and thus that he probably knew about and approved 
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of the dance location.31 It is possible that Wash was there, supporting the 
dancers and participating in the group event by his very presence. He was 
a prominent sponsor of other Sun Dances during this period of suppres-
sion. In describing the dances in his youth, Conner Chapoose noted that 
Ute individuals would sponsor dancers or contribute to the feast follow-
ing the dance: "They'd either donate a beef if they had any cattle, like 
for instance Mr. Wash. He would make a statement at the time that he 
would furnish a beef for the food, and that was supporting the program 
as they was putting it on."32 In this and in other instances, Wash actively 
supported a ceremony deemed retrogressive and traditional by the very 
white officials who dubbed him the leading progressive Ute stockman. 
Superintendent Albert Kneale, who replaced Martin in January 1915, 
was not particularly concerned about the Sun Dance. He considered it 
to be a fairly benign, rather commercialized celebration put on to at-
tract tourist dollars.33 Kneale was more concerned about the appearance 
of peyote at Uintah-Ouray and the threat it posed to the welfare and 
advancement of the Ute people. 
In 1914, Sam Lone Bear, an Oglala Sioux, introduced the peyote 
Cross Fire ritual to the Northern Utes. Working out of Dragon, Utah, 
an isolated narrow-gauge railroad terminal seventy-five miles from Fort 
Duchesne, Lone Bear held services and spread word of the benefits of 
peyote, particularly its curative properties. By 1916, half of the nearly 
twelve hundred Northern Utes participated in the peyote religion. Once 
again, Utes integrated the individualistic, power-seeking, and therapeutic 
elements of a new ritual into their own belief system. In later years, the 
Tipi Way became more popular among Northern Ute peyotists, perhaps 
because Lone Bear's unsavory business dealings and sexual reputation 
discredited the Cross Fire ritual.34 
Ute peyotism came under attack between 1916 and 1918 when both 
Congress and the state of Utah considered bills to outlaw peyote. Wit-
nesses before a House subcommittee testified that peyote roadmen tar-
geted "prosperous" Ute Indians, those with cattle, in order to addict them 
and "control their funds." They told of once prosperous Ute farms now 
"neglected" because of peyote addiction and claimed that Lone Bear coun-
selled Ute stockmen to stay at home and pray to Peyote to look after their 
cattle. Other experts testified to the deaths and other detrimental physical 
as well as economic effects of the drug on progressive Indian farmers.35 
Superintendent Kneale informed his superiors that" 40 to 50 percent of 
the Indians on this reservation are, or have been, partakers of this drug." 
Lone Bear, Kneale reported, deliberately set out to interest "some of our 
very best men, particularly McCook, Witchits, Monk Shavanaux, Cap-
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tain Jenks, Grant, Corass, and William Wash. These men were all leaders 
among their people."36 
As it turned out, Wash, the progressive Uintah Ute farmer, rancher, 
and emerging leader, was indeed an active and vocal peyotist. In 1917 
Kneale called in U.S. marshalls to control the liquor and peyote traffic 
around Dragon. He advised Utes to abandon peyotism because it would 
kill them. Once again, Wash took his people's problems to the commis-
sioner of Indian affairs. On 12 May 1917, Wash dictated the following 
letter, signing it with his thumbprint: 
My Dear Commissioner: 
We want to know why these United States Marshalls come in 
here and try to get us to stop church. We like Church. We want to 
meet every Sunday and have Church and pray and be good. We don't 
want to steal, nor drink whiskey, nor play cards nor gamble nor lie 
and we want to rest on Sunday and then on Monday we want to work 
and farm .... Sometimes sick people sometimes die and sometimes 
we eat Peote and it make us better. Sometimes people die and no eat 
Peote. They die. Maybe eat Peote, no die. Horses die, cows die, sheep 
die. They no eat Peote. You can't stop them dieing. Anything die. 
Long time live maybe so eat Peote. We want to be good and we want 
you to let us have Church and not send Police from Washington to 
make us stop. You tell us why you do this. We don't know. 
I have been here a long time and all the Indians like me and 
they ask me to write and ask you what is the matter. Randlett Indi-
ans maybe so they eat Peote. Pretty good, I guess. The White Rocks 
Indians no eat Peote. No like it and they like Whiskey and they play 
cards and fight, maybe so kill 'em. We don't like that, we want to 
be good.3? 
Assistant Commissioner E. B. Meritt answered Wash's letter, explain-
ing that he opposed the use of peyote because attending and recovering 
from peyote meetings took too much time, and because "it is bad medi-
cine making many Indians sick, some crazy and killing others." Meritt 
noted that Utah state law prohibited the sale and use of peyote. He closed 
in typically paternal fashion by telling Wash, "If you and your people 
want to be good you should do what we think is right and best for you 
and what the laws of the State and the United States require that you 
should do."38 
Wash and his friends were not satisfied with this reply or with the 
suggestion that they talk to Kneale. On 3 July Wash responded to Meritt's 
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objections, stressing the positive aspects of peyote use and pointing out 
that it was no more disruptive than Christian Sunday services: 
You say for me to talk the matter over with my superintendent but 
he won't talk to me cause I eat peyote. He won't shake hands with 
me. When I have my Superintendent to write for me I don't get any 
answer for it .... He don't like to write letters for Indians. The 
Superintendent's Indians at White Rocks play cards. He lets them 
play cards and he don't stop them. 
I don't drink any more and I don't play cards nor swear. I go 
to meeting and eat peyote and that made me throwaway drinking, 
playing cards and swearing. Church makes us good people. We are 
good when we go to Church. We farm all week and just have church 
on Sunday, just one day. We all work hard all week and go to church 
on Sunday after week's work is done. I raise all my own garden, all 
the food to eat myself and have good garden and just go to Church 
on Sunday. The Bible say that we should go to church on Sunday and 
rest. The Missionaries say to go to Church on Sunday too. 
Meritt answered quickly this time, apparently aware that he was 
dealing with an influential and persistent individual. He assured Wash 
that he would write Kneale and have him explain the laws. He applauded 
Wash's "progress" and admonished him to give up peyotism. "If you are 
anxious to do what is right I hope you will stop using peyote and advise 
the other Indians to do likewise. Peyote will not make Indians live longer 
but instead will shorten their lives."39 Meritt advised Kneale that "by 
taking this Indian into your confidence it is possible that he can be induced 
to give up the peyote habit and use his influence in persuading others to 
do likewise." Kneale replied that he had held "many conversations with 
Mr. Wash relative to the peyote situation," and that Wash had discussed 
it with "many other employees in this jurisdiction," but to no avail.40 
Wash refused to accept the paternal advice of these two men. His 
own experiences led him to very different conclusions regarding peyote. 
He wrote Meritt a final note: 
I received your letter of July 18th and will say that I do not wish to 
hear from you any more. Do not write to me any more and I will not 
write to you. Indian no eat peyote, he die anyhow. Sometime he die 
young and sometime live long time. I will die anyhow. I will die if I 
eat peyote and I will die if I don't. White people die no eat peyote. 
I have a good home and have a good farm. I stay home all the 
time and watch cattle and sheep. I herd them in the mountain now. I 
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send my boy to white school to learn and be good. I like to have my 
boy be good and learn to talk and read and write. They don't learn 
them to be bad and swear and steal, they teach them to be good all 
the time. I die sometime and my boy will have my house and farm 
and cattle and sheep. He stay there and live.41 
With that, Wash ended his correspondence, but not his involvement with 
the peyote religion. 
Who was Wash defending and why? From the available evidence it 
appears that Northern Ute peyotists were mostly older full-blood Utes, 
frequently the people Kneale deemed progressive, the "very best men," 
the "leaders among their people." Peyote use was centered in the commu-
nities of Dragon and Randlett and occurred along the Indian Bench all 
the way to Myton-areas of predominantly Uintah and Uncompahgre Ute 
settlement (bands always considered the more progressive and economi-
cally self-sufficient among the Utes). Some argue that these progressive 
full-bloods were seeking a way to maintain particularly "Indian" cultural 
values in the face of directed culture change, to achieve group solidarity as 
Utes and as pan-Indians. Contemporaries observed that individuals, par-
ticularly young educated Indians, adopted peyotism to gain social pr.omi-
nence and leadership status otherwise denied them under existing tribal 
structures.42 Wash's active participation can be seen as an attempt both to 
revitalize or perpetuate elements he believed valuable in Ute culture and, 
despite his age, to gain social leadership status in addition to his economic 
prominence. 
While many Northern Utes accepted peyotism, there remained a sig-
nificant faction adamantly opposed to its use, deeming it dangerous, ex-
pensive, or simply an intrusive cultural element. The White River Utes 
living around Whiterocks, long considered conservative traditionalists, 
apparently rejected peyotism. Wash exposed them by playing off the 
"virtues" of peyote against their "vices" of gambling and drinking and 
thus claimed the moral high ground. Other peyote opponents included 
mixed-blood and younger boarding school-educated Utes from all three 
bands. In 1924, forty-six White River Utes petitioned the Interior Depart-
ment and Congress to "prevent the traffic of peyote and remove it from 
the Indian reservations of the United States."43 Indian Bureau suppression 
and factional opposition within the tribe drove peyotism underground in 
the 1920S and 1930S. In the 1930S the issue merged with an increasing an-
tagonism between full- and mixed-blood Utes over mixed-blood control 
of the tribal business committee. The resulting social and political fac-
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tionalism ultimately contributed to the termination of mixed-blood Utes 
in 1954.44 
It is unclear whether William Wash became a peyote leader, yet 
his open defense of it and his defiance surely increased his influence 
among segments of the Ute people. Peyote did not physically or financially 
ruin Wash. Kneale recalled that Wash, "a well-to-do and patriotic Ute," 
purchased one thousand dollars' worth of coupon bonds during World 
War 1.45 In 1923, Wash owned six hundred head of sheep, which he leased 
to the care of white herders, as well as several hundred cattle, which he 
personally supervised. "He also controls a large acreage of farming land 
and this is leased to white men," wrote Superintendent Fred A. Gross. 
"He is one of the most progressive Indians we have and is successful in his 
various activities."46 While it is possible that Wash's "lapse" into leasing 
was a result of his peyote use, it is more probable that, since Wash was 
getting old and his son was in school, he could not personally manage 
his considerable estate. Leasing then became a viable short-term option 
that he could supervise to make sure the land was not lost to white 
ranchers. 
Wash's wealth and political recognition increased dramatically in his 
later years. He was a leading member of the council which chose R. T. 
Bonnin as the Ute tribal attorney in 1926, and he represented the Uintah 
band in council meetings designed to form a tribal business committee in 
1927. His age, wealth, peyotism, and outspokenness are probably what 
kept him off the final business committee, yet they gained him the recog-
nition of both Utes and whites as a spokesman for the full-blood and 
Uintah Utes.47 
Wash spoke with particular authority on issues affecting Ute lands 
and land use. In 1925, Uintah Utes included Wash in a delegation bound 
for Washington, DC. While other members focused on "missing" annuity 
payments, siphoned off to pay for the Uintah Irrigation Project, Wash 
articulated the fears of his people that whites were scheming to gain COn-
trol of the grazing reserve. Wash told bureau officials that he ran about 
570 cattle, 800 sheep, and 70 horses on the grazing reserve, and that "we 
do not want any white men to come and take that piece of land away 
from us again because it is very small." He complained of having trouble 
with trespassing white ranchers and with forest rangers who restricted 
his access to former Ute grazing lands within the Uinta National Forest, 
"so that it makes it pretty hard for me to get along with these fellows." 
And in particular he complained that white homesteaders and irrigation 
companies took water properly belonging to Ute allottees. 
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In the second half of his speech, Wash moved from issues affect-
ing Ute ranchers to the desires of those who were not so economically 
progressive-those without cattle or allotments. In an apparent ideologi-
cal flip-flop, he suggested that unused portions of the grazing reserve be 
leased "so all Indians could get a little benefit of it, those that don't own 
any stock." He also suggested that arable areas of the grazing reserve be 
allotted to Ute children. He told the commissioner: "I am making this 
statement because I am old. I may not live long but I would like to have 
these children allotted because by and by white men might take it away 
and the children would be homeless. We would like to have the children 
allotted so that they will have something when they grow up." Wash, the 
"progressive" farmer and cattleman, recognized both the needs and rights 
of those Utes without cattle or land to share in the tribal estate. At the 
same time he reiterated his desire to preserve the integrity of what was 
left of the Ute land base, to leave enough land and water to sustain Ute 
identity and independence against the wave of white homesteaders.48 
Indian Bureau officials listened to Wash and the other Ute delegates 
and ultimately acted on Wash's recommendation, but they twisted his 
intent in the process. In 1927 the bureau levied grazing fees on ranchers 
running more than one hundred horses or head of cattle or five hundred 
sheep on the grazing reserve. Ostensibly, the point was to provide a more 
equitable distribution of tribal assets between those using the range and 
those without livestock, but in fact the fees promised to open more of the 
reserve to white stockmen who could afford to pay them. These fees posed 
a major problem for stock-rich but cash-poor Utes who found few out-
side markets and low prices for their livestock. The fees and regulations 
themselves posed a threat to Ute sovereignty. Wash, the premier stockman 
and cultural middleman, was the one individual most threatened by this 
fee system. 
In January 1928 a number of older full-bloods from all three bands 
gathered in council to petition the Indian Bureau to lift the fees on live-
stock. Most owned no stock and had no vested interest in the outcome. 
Sampannies (Saponeis Cuch), a conservative White River leader, vigor-
ously argued that Wash (and all full-bloods) should be allowed to run his 
stock on the grazing reserve without paying a fee. "We want his stock to 
be left alone. They have a right on our grazing land," Sampannies told the 
council. "We are doing this in order that Mr. Wash can hold our grazing 
land for us for some day some of us other Indians may have stock and want 
to run our stock on the grazing land." Sampannies, voicing full-blood Ute 
resentment toward the growing number and the political and economic 
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influence of mixed-blood Utes, declared that anyone of less than one-half 
Ute blood had no right to use the tribal grazing reserve. Older full-blood 
leaders like John Duncan, Cesspooch, and Dick Wash and newer Business 
Committee leaders like John Yesto agreed. They defended Wash's right 
to use the grazing reserve, praised him as an example for the younger 
generation, and denied the mixed-bloods. Yet underpinning their support 
for Wash was an understanding that the real issue was sovereignty, the 
ultimate right to control their tribal resources. "Why," asked Cesspooch, 
"should we pay for our own land?"49 
Wash spoke at the end of the council, summing up the arguments of 
sovereignty by recapping his life experiences as a cultural intermediary, as 
one who tried to play by two sets of changing rules and expectations: 
When the agency was first established I was advised that stock raising 
was very profitable and I took that advice and I have found that it 
is so. Later on arrangements were made and the grazing land set 
aside for our use. It was then said that the grazing land was for the 
Indians['] own use and that they could increase their herds as much 
as they wanted as long as they had grazing land and were not to 
be charged any fee whatever. At the present time why should we be 
charged for our grazing land? I feel that I should be given a little con-
sideration because I am the leading example of the whole tribe. I feel 
that I have been capable of holding the grazing land as a whole be-
cause I have more stock on the grazing land than any other Indian and 
the other Indians appreciate the fact that I have held the grazing land 
for them. That is why they have made their statements here today. 
Wash played on his dual role, first in holding tribal land against out-
siders and secondly in providing a progressive example of the benefits of 
work and self-sufficiency for Ute schoolchildren. In closing, he reiterated 
his long-standing objections to the alienation of Ute land and his hopes 
for an independent future for his people: "We have always been peace-
able people and we intend to live here that way always. This is our home 
and we do not want to be disturbed .... We do not like for any white 
persons or anybody else to try to have our grazing land thrown open. We 
object to that very much. We feel that our younger people are beginning 
to realize the benefits derived from our grazing lands. We do not want to 
be discouraged by such hard regulations."5o Yet in the end the commis-
sioner ignored the council and reaffirmed the new fee regulation. Shortly 
after word of the decision reached Uintah-Ouray, William Wash fell ill. 
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Following a month-long struggle Wash, aged sixty-three, died on 30 April 
1928 at his home on the Indian Bench near Fort Duchesne.51 
Wash's life illustrates some of the fundamental problems scholars face 
in defining individual Indians, or entire factions, for that matter, as pro-
gressive or traditional on the basis of narrow social or economic issues. 
Defining factions is difficult enough. What variables (kinship, residence, 
economics, religion, etc.) defined factional groups? Were they "floating 
coalitions of interests rather than of persons," and were the ends always 
disputed, or just the means to those ends?52 The activities of William 
Wash indicate that individuals frequently transcend the bounds of static 
factional categories; that these coalitions were informal, fluid, and issue-
oriented as frequently as not; and that the means were perhaps more divi-
sive than the ends. Wash plotted a course different from the traditionalist 
White Rivers, clashing with them over certain issues. Each undoubtedly 
suspected the other's methods and motives. Yet Wash and his White River 
opponents united on a number of other issues. Factionalism at Uintah-
Ouray evolved from preexisting kinship and band differences, bloomed 
with economic and land use disputes from the 1880s through the 1930S, 
and played itself out under the guise of mixed-blood-full-blood politics 
in the 1950S.53 
The problem with dichotomizing factions into progressive and tradi-
tional elements is, as Fred Hoxie points out, that "there were usually more 
than two sides to most questions, and no single side coincided with the 
cause of resistance for the survival of tribal culture." Indian communities 
contained "a variety of interest groups which took a variety of positions 
on public issues," and accounting for community or cultural survivals by 
praising one group as traditional against all others "flattens history and 
distorts the complexity of reservation life." 54 Equating progressive with 
change and traditional with resistance sacrifices individually complex be-
havior, diminishing our understanding of Native Americans' rationales 
and responses. 
Defining traditional and progressive elements or actions is equally 
difficult because what passes for tradition changes over time. When inno-
vations can be and are interpreted as cultural continuities, the category 
traditional becomes little more than a temporal indicator.55 Institutions 
today regarded as conservative among the Northern Utes (the Sun Dance 
and peyotism, for example) were revitalized or innovative features in 
Wash's time. The most conservative elements of Ute society opposed pey-
ote, while so-called progressives embraced the pan-Indian religion. Today 
at Uintah-Ouray, that group definition would be reversed. Wash's actions, 
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which appeared progressive to agents and other Utes, in time manifested 
rather conservative intents or results. 
Then there is the jockeying for semantic position or advantage. Dif-
ferent sides in a dispute might claim to be traditional in order to gain the 
moral high ground and discredit the others. Each side usually has some 
legitimate claims to tradition, and yet each is equally untraditional. The 
opposite strategy, claiming progressive attitudes and actions for moral 
or political advantage, is also possible. As Loretta Fowler points out, 
"Indians have often ... tried to influence federal policy by presenting 
themselves and their constituents as 'progressive,''' to preserve or pro-
tect certain cultural elements. But this strategy is double-edged.56 The 
real problem begins when modern readers see this dichotomy and unwit-
tingly read in a whole set of values and traits which may not be present, 
allowing no leeway for individual and qualitative distinctions. Given the 
modern predisposition towards cultural pluralism and the emergence of 
"pan-traditionalists," progressives have become politically suspect and are 
not considered particularly "authentic." 57 The result: simplifying or dis-
crediting through semantics alone. 
A final problem with the progressive-traditional dichotomy is that 
it too frequently implies either that one is progressive and committed 
to change or that one is traditional and resists attempts to alter cul-
tural features. It also suggests a zero-sum equation, a "cultural replace-
ment" in which one discards Indian ways in proportion to the assimila-
tion of white goods or ways. There appears to be no middle ground in 
the dichotomy, no ambiguity in individual thought, action, or value, no 
notion of differential as opposed to unilinear (or unidirectional) change. 
And yet we acknowledge the presence and importance of certain indi-
viduals who embody these ambiguities as cultural middlemen, intermedi-
aries, bicultural brokers in search of balance. As middlemen, they ex-
emplify the coexistence of oppositions. They frequently work both sides 
(or multiple sides) and run the danger of alienating both reservation offi-
cials and various Indian factions.58 Ambivalence appears more frequently 
than a progressive-traditional dichotomy among established and emerg-
ing leaders and, I would argue, among the more numerous and less visible 
individuals like William Wash. 
These terms are not inherently problematical; indeed, they have 
some descriptive merit, even if simply as academic shorthand for issue-
specific situations. The problem lies in their misuse, in the simplification, 
the dichotomization, of complex issues, personalities, and relationships. 
Creating new sets of terms will not solve it. Dividing the progressive-
traditional dichotomy into three or four categories-for example, "native-
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oriented," "transitionals," "lower- and upper-acculturated" -is perhaps 
better but still suggests overly static organization and a unilinear progres-
sion.59 Describing a group or faction demands a generalization, a search 
for the "common." But in that search we should never lose sight of indi-
vidual complexity and variability over time. We must define and redefine 
circumstances and try to convey the ambiguity of human motive and 
action within the common. Nowhere are those complexities and ambi-
guities greater than in the changing nature of nineteenth- and twentieth-
century reservation leadership and in the emergence of the intermediaries, 
the cultural brokers, the William Washes. 
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